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Abstract
We study the alternating-offer bargaining problem of sharing a common value pie under in-
complete information on both sides and no depreciation between two identical players. We
characterise the essentially unique perfect Bayesian equilibrium of this game which turns
out to be in gradually increasing offers. (JEL C73, C78, D44, D82, J12. Keywords: Gradual
bargaining, Common values, Incomplete information, Repeated games.)
Introduction
We study a bargaining situation where the mutual offers made by two privately informed
players signal, in the course of bargaining, their private information to the opponent. The
players bargain on an indivisible object that is of either a high or low value. Both players know
these possible values. Before bargaining commences, each player is sent one private signal of
publicly known precision refining his prior on the object’s value. These signals can be either
high or low and their precision (accuracy) is the probability with which this signal equals the
true value of the object. We call the player with the higher signal accuracy player one (P1) and
the other player two (P2). The main rule of bargaining is that once a player has made an offer
and this was rejected, she must subsequently offer a strictly higher payment to the opponent.
We define a minimal admissible offer-increment kept constant at 1 (currency) unit. As the high
value of the object is increased, the relative size of this increment gets arbitrarily small.
Many economic applications lend themselves to our interpretation of bargaining. Our
study of non-depreciating common values—the non-depreciation part of which we share with
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Zeuthen (1930)—complements the analysis of depreciating private values by Sta˚hl (1972) or
Rubinstein (1982). Their assumption of depreciation typically leads to immediate or tempo-
rally very finely tuned agreement in subgame perfect equilibrium. This phenomenon, how-
ever, is often not observed in bargaining situations in which signalling of common values
matters. Some examples captured within our framework are: (1) A partnership dissolution
problem where two asymmetrically informed players jointly own a firm. (2) Agreeing on a
profit sharing rule between two firms involved in a joint venture. (3) The ‘buying out’ of par-
ties holding dispersed property rights (or patents) needed for the production of some good or
service. (4) Deciding whether to spin-off some yet-to-be-proven innovation (‘selling the project
to the manager’) or developing it inside the firm. (5) Splitting an inheritance (eg. an Amish
farm or company) under the provision of maintaining it as a unit.1
Incomplete information bargainingmodels are typically plagued by a plethora of equilibria.
One might expect that the signalling aspect introduced by the common value nature of the
object further accentuates this problem. This is, however, incorrect. Indeed our analysis shows
that we can identify pairs of signal accuracies for which our game has the following essentially
unique perfect Bayesian equilibrium:2
• Players who observe a high signal, ie. high-type players, always continue bidding up
in minimal increments and with probability 1 until some highest equilibrium offer is
reached.
• Low-type players start by using the same probability 1 continuation actions as above
until one player’s certain quitting payoff becomes lower than their prior-based continu-
ation payoffs. This is first the case with the less-precisely informed P2. In order to avoid
quitting by P2, P1 needs to play a mixed stage action in order to i) directly change P2’s
continuation payoff and ii) change P2’s beliefs on P1’s signal given that P1’s continuation
action is observed. Whether the low-type P1 or P2 starts mixing depends on whether
P1’s or P2’s bid first exceeds the object’s expectation given that both players receive high
signals (ie. the highest possible value of the object). After a low-type player starts mixing,
all subsequent stage moves by both players are mixed until the same highest equilibrium
offer is reached as above.
Depending on the individual signal accuracies, there are other equilibria in our bargaining
game. Disregarding knife-edge cases, however, these are all (essentially) unique for their pa-
rameter region. We provide an example in the appendix which illustrates this for any combi-
nation of signal accuracies. We focus on the equilibrium outlined above because, disregarding
knife-edge cases, it puts the highest requirements on the agents’ patience and is hardest to im-
plement. Once this equilibrium is characterised, other equilibria for different signal precisions
1 In the Roman Republic, a proconsul was a promagistrate who, after serving as consul, spent a year as a gover-
nor of a province. Each province had two consuls. In certain provinces negotiations between the two consuls,
each of whom had veto power, decided who was to become proconsul.
2 We call an equilibrium ‘essentially’ unique if all stage actions but (for certain parameter-values) the final one
are unique and all final actions lead to the same outcome.
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can be found relatively easily by dropping the mixture or continuation requirements on the
final stages of the game.
The reason for the essential uniqueness of our proposed equilibrium is that players do not
allow their beliefs to be ‘wilfully manipulated’ by the opponent. That is, Pi cannot plan an
equilibrium action which induces P-i to respond using a belief-triggered action (eg. immediate
quitting after a jump-bid) which is beneficial only to a certain type of Pi. Thus observing an
on- or off-equilibrium-path action by Pi, the low-type P-i’s equilibrium response must be based
on the belief which makes her indifferent between accepting the current offer by quitting (ben-
eficial to a high-type Pi) and continuing to make a (minimally) higher own offer (beneficial to
a low-type Pi). This suffices to force unique on and off-equilibrium path beliefs. Furthermore,
the efficient agreement is reached gradually and stochastically over a stretch of multiple rounds
of offers and counteroffers—not immediately as implied by depreciation in other bargaining
models.
There is a rich literature on bargaining with incomplete information. Extensive surveys
on bargaining under incomplete information are presented by Kennan and Wilson (1993) and
Ausubel, Cramton, and Deneckere (2002) but, to present, the only full analysis of incomplete
information bargaining over an object’s pure common value allowing for bids by both players
is Schweinzer (2003). The present study extends this model to asymmetric incomplete infor-
mation on both sides. The main difference to the setting with incomplete information on one
side is the introduction of imperfectly informative signals to both players. Hence in contrast
to the one sided incomplete information scenario, the better informed player need not neces-
sarily know everything the less-well informed player knows but gains additional information
by learning the lower-precision signal. We model this signal accuracy as a discrete version of
ideas developed by Athey and Levin (1998) and Persico (2000) as an extension of their concept
of signal sufficiency.
Our model of incomplete information on both sides encompasses all situations where the
asymmetrically informed players can form more precise conditional expectations on the ob-
ject’s value if they learn the opponent’s signal. The special assumptions on priors, possible
bids and preferences extend easily. Generalising the type space to a larger set of possible val-
ues retains the result in the sense that a low-signal player alwaysmimics the high-signal player.
Nothing but the technical difficulty stops us from introducing depreciation. If common values
are replaced by private values and the incomplete information is about the players’ willingness
to pay our results remain applicable in a different realm.
1 The model
We consider two risk-neutral players {P1,P2} and the simplest case of an indivisible object
taking only two possible common values θ ∈ {θ, θ¯} with θ = 0, θ¯ ∈ R, θ¯ ≥ 3. Nature chooses
θ with the publicly known probability ϕ0 = pr(θ = θ¯) = 1/2. Subsequently, Nature sends a
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private signal s ∈ {s, s} to each player. These signals are of publicly known accuracy pi =
pr(si = s¯i|θ¯) = pr(si = si|θ) ∈ [
1/2, 1], i = 1, 2, where p =
1/2 is uninformative and p = 1 is
fully revealing.3 We assume p1, p2 to be i.i.d. conditional on the realised value θ and denote
(p1, p2) by p. Hence the unconditional ex-ante probability of receiving a high signal is pr(si =
s¯) = ϕ0 = 1/2 for both players. We call the more accurately informed player, ie. the player with
the higher p, P1. We define Pi’s beliefs as the conditional probability with which he believes
the other player to have received a high signal, ie. ϕi = pr(s−i = s¯|si). On the basis of his
own signal, player Pi updates these beliefs through his observation of his opponent’s bidding
behaviour.
By assumption, the game starts with P1 offering a payment o11 (subscripts are players, su-
perscripts time periods) to P2 for sole ownership of the object. As a convention, we sign P1’s
offers positive and P2’s negative. If P2 accepts the offer, P1 pays the offered amount to P2,
P1 gets the object and the game is over. If P2 does not accept P1’s offer, nothing is paid, and
P2 makes an own offer. Players go on making alternating offers until one player quits. We
denote by gti = |o
t
i − o
t−2
i | the current increment over the last own offer, set o
0
2 = o
−1
1 = 0 and
introduce the notion of player i’s bid as the running sum of both players’ offer-increments
bti =
∑t
tˆ=1 g
tˆ = |ot−1−i | + o
t
i. (Thus if P1’s initial offer of, say, o
1
1 = 1 is followed by o
3
1 = 3 then
g31 = 2, if o
2
2 = −1, b
3
1 = 4.) It turns out to simplify the formal analysis to use this bid as stage
action.4 Pure bids bti are restricted to the set of possible bids B = {0, 1, . . .} ⊂ N bounded above
by some B¯ ∈ B (‘all the money in the world’) with B¯ > θ¯. We require bids to be strictly increas-
ing in t, ie. all continuation increments are gti ≥ 1 while g
t
i < 1 is interpreted as quitting (‘q’).
This implicitly defines the minimal admissible bidding increment as 1 ‘currency unit.’ Hence
by increasing the above value θ¯, one decreases the relative admissible minimal bidding incre-
ment. Mixed bids attach probability αti to the pure continuation bid b
t
i and the complementary
probability to quitting, ie. accepting the current offer and ending the game. We denote such
mixed actions as [αti : b
t
i, q] where the continuation action b
t
i is played with probability α
t
i and q
with the complementary probability (1 − αti).
5 Finally we define a jump bid as jti = g
t
i − 1 ≥ 0
and keep a running sum of player i’s jump bids as J ti =
∑t
tˆ=1 j
tˆ
i .
Pi’s (repeated game) strategy βi consists of the sequence of (mixed) stage actions [α
t
i : b
t
i, q]
for each possible plan of the opponent. Players observe the opponents’ pure offers and enjoy
perfect recall. The players’ final expected payoffs are written ui(β|s) and consist of the object’s
value minus payments made for the winner of the object and the payments received for the
looser. Player i’s quitting payoff when accepting an offer at t is written uti(q). The history of
play ht consists of all observed continuation actions not including time t.
3 The case of p = (1, 1/2) is a game with incomplete information on one side as analysed in Schweinzer (2003).
4 Our dynamic game can be alternatively understood as a finitely repeated game of incomplete information as
defined by Aumann and Maschler (1966) and subsequently developed by Mertens, Sorin, and Zamir (1994,
chp. IV). That literature, however, typically derives average payoffs from long interactions which do not arise
naturally in our context. We will, however, use the repeated game terminology whenever convenient.
5 We refrain from a more general definition of a mixed stage action (over a larger support of pure actions)
because we will not need anything more complicated than the above.
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For ease of exposition, we introduce some notation. Pi is the high-type Pi, Pi the low type.
Since si is player i’s high signal and si his low signal, we write the possible signal profiles
as s, s21, s
1
2, and s. Similarly, we write the object’s expected value given the possible signal
combinations as E, E¯
2
1, E¯
1
2, E¯. Finally, we denote the low type Pi’s, time-t beliefs by ϕ
t
i
and
the high type’s beliefs by ϕ¯ti. In the appendix we also occasionally discriminate Pi’s mixed
continuation probability given a low signal αi from the probability i chooses when having
received a high signal α¯i.
To sum up, our model—called a ‘queto’ game QB—is a standard alternating-offer bargain-
ing gamewith incomplete information over common values on both sides and no discounting.6
We end this section by stating the definitions required to formulate our result.
Definition 1. An equilibrium is called essentially unique if it is unique unless ⌊E¯⌋ = E¯, in which
case the final equilibrium mixture of the game (all of which leading to the same outcome) is arbitrary.7
Definition 2. A privately informed player’s strategy is called separating if it deterministically reveals
the object’s value prior to the final equilibrium stage of the game.
Definition 3. A strategy is called minimal-increment strategy if all actions it contains increase the
previous own bid by a mixture α ∈ [0, 1] between quitting and the minimum of one.
2 Discussion
The idea of the equilibrium candidate β∗ outlined in the introduction is that both low types al-
ways mix between periods ts and tf − 1 (which we call the ’main game’) while both high types
always continue increasing their offers minimally with probability 1 until bidding reaches ⌊E¯⌋.
Both low-type players mix in equilibrium in order to make their low-type opponents mix in
turn. Compared to the game with incomplete information on one side this creates the com-
plication that these mixtures change both players’ beliefs which are crucial the calculation of
the continuation payoff expectations (and thus the own next-period mixture condition). Hence
the low-type’s mixture conditions at each stage of the main game are harder to enforce than
in the game with incomplete information on one side. The next paragraphs try to convey the
intuition of what precisely is going.
It is helpful for understanding the equilibrium dynamics to see that, on the one hand, P2
is made indifferent between quitting and minimally increasing through her beliefs ϕt
2
set by
the previous period’s αt−11 . P1, on the other hand, is made indifferent between quitting and
minimally increasing through P2’s next period’s mixture probability αt+12 . Thus the mixing
dynamics of the game are, for odd E¯, as follows: P1 starts mixing at period ts (defined as
6 The name derives from the player’s stage actions of either quitting or vetoing the current proposal. The idea
of our game is similar to the quitting games introduced by Vieille and Solan (2001) in the context of complete
information stochastic games. They define quitting games as sequential games in which, at any stage, each
player has the choice between a single continuation bid and quitting.
7 The notation ⌊x⌋ denotes the greatest integer not exceeding some real x; ⌈x⌉ is the integer directly above x.
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the period before the less well informed P2’s continuation payoffs from the prior-based β∗ are
below her quitting payoffs at ts+1). P1’s mixing with any α
ts
1 (based on his prior beliefs ϕ
ts
1
) de-
termines a unique mixture probability αts+12 at the subsequent stage. This mixture probability,
in turn, determines a unique belief ϕts+2
1
which allows P1’s mixing and thus in turn determines
a unique αts+42 and so on until the final period tf − 1 where P2 mixes. We refer to this chain of
reasoning which determines a unique αt2 at all even t in the main game as the forward chain.
Conversely, P2’s final belief ϕ
tf−1
2 (before P1 quits at tf ) is determined from her mixture
condition over terminal payoffs. This indifference belief, in turn, determines a unique α
tf−2
1
which generates this belief. This α
tf−2
1 , however, also determines P2’s payoffs at tf − 3 and
thus requires a unique ϕ
tf−3
2 in order to ensure P2’s indifference. This belief again determines
uniquely its generating α
tf−4
1 and so on until P1’s first mixture period is reached at ts. Thus all
αt1 for odd t are uniquely determined through this backward chain from the terminal beliefs.
The dynamics for even E¯ are similar: P2 quits at the continuation bid E¯ which determines
P1’s previous period’s beliefs. These, in turn, determine P2’s mixture one more period ahead
and so on until the prior-based equilibrium continuation payoff exceeds the quitting payoff and
P2 stops mixing but continues minimally with probability 1. Since this leaves P1’s terminal
mixture probability undefined, it determines P2’s mixture probability one period backwards.
Hence there is no need for P1 to mix before P2’s first mixture because his following period
mixture directly manipulates her continuation payoff.
The basic requirement from β∗ is that, at each stage of the main game, a low-type player
must be indifferent between all pure actions contained in the support of his mixed action
1. P1 mixes at odd t iff ut1(q) = u
t+1
1 (β
∗|s) or
t− 1
2
+ J t−12 = (1− ϕ
t
1
)
[
(1− αt+12 )
(
E−
t+ 1
2
− J t1
)
+ αt+12
(
t+ 1
2
+ J t+12
)]
+
ϕt
1
[
t+ 1
2
+ J t+12
]
resulting in a the mixture probability
αt+12 =
(1− ϕt
1
)(t+ J t1 + J
t+1
2 − E+ 1)− j
t−1
2 − 1
(1− ϕt
1
)(t+ J t1 + J
t+1
2 − E+ 1)
(2.1)
which equals in equilibrium
∗αt+12 =
(1− ϕt
1
)(t− E+ 1)− 1
(1− ϕt
1
)(t− E+ 1)
.
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In addition, P1’s beliefs ϕt
1
must stem from the application of Bayes’ rule
ϕt
1
= pr(s¯2|h
t−1, s1) =
pr(bt−12 |s¯2) pr(s¯2)
pr(bt−12 |s¯2) pr(s¯2) + pr(b
t−1
2 |s2) pr(s2)
=
ϕt−2
1
ϕt−2
1
+ (1− ϕt−2
1
)αt−12
.
(2.2)
2. Similarly, P2 mixes at even t iff ut2(q) = u
t+1
2 (β
∗|s) or
t
2
+ J t−11 = (1− ϕ
t
2
)
[
(1− αt+11 )
(
E−
t
2
− J t2
)
+ αt+11
(
t+ 2
2
+ J t+11
)]
+
ϕt
2
[
t+ 2
2
+ J t+11
]
resulting in
αt+11 =
(1− ϕt
2
)(t+ J t+11 + J
t
2 − E+ 1)− j
t−1
1 − 1
(1− ϕt
2
)(t+ J t+11 + J
t
2 − E+ 1)
(2.3)
which equals in equilibrium
∗αt+11 =
(1− ϕt
2
)(t− E+ 1)− 1
(1− ϕt
2
)(t− E+ 1)
.
As above, P2’s beliefs ϕt
2
must stem from the application of Bayes’ rule
ϕt
2
= pr(s¯1|h
t−1, s2) =
pr(bt−11 |s¯1) pr(s¯1)
pr(bt−11 |s¯1) pr(s¯1) + pr(b
t−1
1 |s1) pr(s1)
=
ϕt−2
2
ϕt−2
2
+ (1− ϕt−2
2
)αt−11
.
(2.4)
The high-type posteriors ϕ¯ti are formed accordingly as a by-product of the low types’ mixing.
The candidate equilibrium β∗ further prescribes
• Both high types always increase their offers minimally with probability 1 as long as the
minimum continuation bid is below ⌈E¯⌉. They quit with probability 1 if the minimum
continuation bid is higher.
• Both low types increase minimally with probability 1 until the less-precisely informed
player’s prior-based continuation expectation is below her quitting payoff (at period ts).
Depending on ⌈E¯⌉, players start to mix at either this or the following period.
• Any deviation from β∗ is countered using minimum increase strategies.
These prescriptions and the above conditions (2.1) and (2.3) apply at each stage of the main
game and, together with Bayes’ rule (2.2) and (2.4), are sufficient to fully define the equilibrium
strategy profile β∗.
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The equilibrium β∗ only exists for certain combinations of signal-accuracies. Sufficient and
necessary conditions for this existence are stated in assumption 2. These conditions depend on
the equilibrium start of mixing t∗s which we can only determine through an iterative procedure
in proposition 1. We cannot eliminate this inconvenience because we are unaware of a closed
form representation of the ratio of Euler Γ-functions (of t∗s) we need to describe the players’ be-
lief processes.8 Assumption 1 allows us to avoid the duplication of our efforts for the case of the
less accurately informed player moving first. It is apparent that for small bidding increments
compared to the object’s value, the difference in terms of payoffs is negligible.
3 Results
Assumption 1. P1 has more accurate information than P2: 1/2 ≤ p2 < p1 ≤ 1.
Assumption 2. The influence of the bidding grid is low in the sense that ⌊E¯⌋ > E¯
1
2. Moreover, in
equilibrium, i) the high type moving at period t = ⌊E¯⌋ bids ⌊E¯⌋ with probability 1 and ii) the low type
moving at t = ⌊E¯⌋ − 1 mixes between bidding ⌊E¯⌋ and quitting.9
The following theorem summarises our main result which is proved in the remainder of
this section. All proofs of lemmata and propositions can be found in the appendix.
Theorem 1. For (p1, p2) satisfying assumptions 1 and 2, β
∗ is the essentially unique perfect Bayesian
equilibrium of QB . This equilibrium involves gradually increasing offers.
Proof. The first two lemmata establish a unique belief-structure on and off any equilibrium
path. Lemmata 4, 5, and 6 provide a backward induction chain from the highest possible bid
forward to the first period. Thus these three lemmata establish β∗ as the essentially unique
equilibrium of QB. Since the β
∗ is explicitly constructed, this also ensures existence. Finally,
proposition 1 gives an exact procedure for the calculation of the period where P1 starts mixing.
From that, expected payoffs can be calculated for any (θ¯, p).
8 To alleviate this nuisance, computational procedures pinning down t∗s are available from the author. We addi-
tionally provide very simple sufficient conditions (A.4) & (A.5) which make it easy to find a profile (p1, p2) for
which the equilibrium β∗ exits.
9 As shown in lemma 4, for odd ⌊E¯⌋ and start of mixing at period ts, requirement i) amounts to the following
condition on P1’s final period equilibrium beliefs
ϕ¯
⌊E¯⌋
1 =
ϕ⌊E¯⌋
1
pr(s¯1, s¯2) pr(s1, s2)
ϕ
⌊E¯⌋
1 pr(s¯1, s¯2) pr(s1, s2) + (1− ϕ
⌊E¯⌋
1 ) pr(s¯1, s2) pr(s1, s¯2)
>
⌊E¯⌋ − E¯
1
2
E¯− E¯
1
2
where
ϕ⌊E¯⌋
1
= ϕ1
1
⌊¯E⌋−ts
2∏
τ= ts−1
2
(2τ + 1)− E− 1
(2τ + 1)− E
= ϕ1
1
Γ(
⌊E¯⌋−ts−E+4
2 )
Γ(
⌊E¯⌋−ts−E+3
2 )
Γ(
ts−E
2 )
Γ(
ts−E+1
2 )
∈ [ϕ1
1
, 1]. (3.1)
Notice that this is a condition on P1’s prior information. In addition we require that all involved mixture
probabilities and beliefs must be well-formed, ie. elements of the unit interval. (There is a similar condition for
even ⌊E¯⌋.)
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The first two lemmata establish a unique belief-structure accompanying β∗.
Lemma 1. There is no separating equilibrium.
Lemma 2. After observing the opponent deviate from the prescribed equilibrium β∗, the observing
player believes that a low-type opponent has mixed with the unique probability which makes her in-
different between quitting and continuing at the stage directly following the observed deviation. If the
mixture-probability required for indifference is greater than 1, the responding player quits and if it is
smaller than zero, she continues with her equilibrium action with probability 1.
Lemma 3 is an accounting argument used in the successive reasoning.
Lemma 3. Under assumption 1, we have 0 < E < E1 < E2 < E¯
2
1 < E¯
1
2 < E¯ < θ¯.
Our main argument is a backward induction proof from the highest possible bid (‘all the
money in the world’) back to the first period of the game. It comprises of the following three
lemmata. Lemma 4 shows that there is a highest equilibrium bid of ⌊E¯⌋ at a period which we
call tf . Lemma 5 establishes optimality and uniqueness of β
∗ in the main game.
Lemma 4. In any equilibrium, Pi quits with probability 1 if her minimal admissible continuation bid
b
tf
i exceeds the object’s highest possible expected value E¯.
The next lemma addresses main-game stages—ie. between the period where mixing starts
(called ts) and the period of the last equilibrium continuation bid of the game (called tf )—and
argues that bids are increased minimally. We first fix the terminal payoffs and then proceed
by backward induction. The argument against jump bids is made by reducing all deviation
payoffs to modified (and smaller) versions of equilibrium payoffs for later periods. The lemma
is lengthy and uses much notation but its nature is straightforward backward induction.
Lemma 5. Given the final period tf defined by the previous lemma, we proceed by backward induction
until a low-type player stops mixing. We call the period of the last low-type mixture ts. The resulting
backward induction path coincides with the equilibrium path β∗.
Lemma 6. β∗ prescribes optimal actions for the ‘preplay’-phase where 1 ≤ t ≤ ts.
Combined, the above three lemmata establish existence and essential uniqueness of the
equilibrium β∗. It does not involve jump bids. In particular they show that there is a period
ts, where low types start to play mixed actions. The next step determines this period ts and
calculates the corresponding payoffs.
Proposition 1. In the equilibrium β∗, the first mixing period t∗s is determined through the final mixing
belief ϕtf−1. This t∗s pins down all expected payoffs.
The above proposition fully and uniquely determines t∗s using a trial & error procedure but
fails to find a closed form representation of t∗s. Hence the resulting payoff characterisations are
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unwieldy and we prefer to present the results of simulations to analyse the payoff implications
of varying the player’s signal precisions. For very low θ¯ and therefore very short games, the
influence of the rule that P1 starts the game blur the general picture. This effects vanishes when
larger values of θ¯ are considered. The simulations show that t∗s is decreasing when the sum of
available information p1+p2 is going down and increasing when it is going up. This is intuitive
as E and E¯ move closer together with less information and further apart with more available
information. As to be expected, Pi’s payoff expectation from β∗ moves in the same direction as
pi when holding p−i fixed. The simulation packages are available from the author.
Conclusion
We present the essentially unique solution to an alternating-offers bargaining problem where
two players are asymmetrically informed about an object’s common value. Extending the ex-
isting literature, we study the effects of the players mutually signalling this private information
during the bargaining process. We find that a privately informed player cannot deterministi-
cally mislead his opponent through actions (such as jump-bids) which can only be beneficial to
a certain type. Thus the opponent—after observing such an action—will not make inferences
about the player’s type after such an observation which differ from those made in equilib-
rium. Indeed if she would, she could be made to believe anything the deviating player wishes.
Hence the player observing a deviation has no option but to keep using her equilibrium strat-
egy which only allows for unique beliefs on and off the equilibrium path. This restricts the
players to using partially revealing, semi-separating strategies which gradually reveal their
information to the opponent through the use of type-dependent lotteries. This, in turn, ne-
cessitates the mixing by both players which grants an information rent to the more accurately
informed player.
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Appendix
A.1 Proofs
Proof of lemma 1. Suppose the contrary is true and let βˆ1(s1) = (q, . . .) and βˆ1(s¯1) = (1, . . .) be
P1’s type dependent equilibrium separating strategies with full information revelation at t = 1.
Notice that P1’s strategy βˆ1(s1) gives him a payoff of zero because it prescribes immediate
quitting while βˆ1(s¯1) ensures him a positive payoff. Hence P1 will optimally deviate from his
separating equilibrium action q to mimicking his high-type by bidding 1 and thereby securing
a payoff strictly higher than zero. But this contradicts the separating strategies βˆ1 being part of
an equilibrium. The same argument holds at any period of the game where P2 can condition
on the information revealed by P1. The argument for P2 is symmetric.
Proof of lemma 2. Suppose the observed deviation from β∗ is by P1. P2’s equilibrium strategy β∗2
is a complete contingent plan containing an equilibrium reaction to each possible action by P1
at each of his information sets—including any possible deviation. In particular, β∗2 prescribes
her equilibrium reaction [∗αt+12 :
∗bt+12 , q] to an observed deviation g˜
t
1 > 1. This equilibrium
response is determined through the above lemma 1 which says that no equilibrium action by
P1 can reveal the object’s true value to P2. Since P2’s pure continuation would be beneficial to
P1 and pure quitting would be beneficial to P1, the only non-revealing action open to P1 is to
make P2 precisely indifferent between quitting and continuing with a higher offer. This means,
in turn, that P2’s equilibrium beliefs on the mixture probabilities involved with observing the
deviation g˜t1 are uniquely determined. (P2 cannot be made indifferent as long as her quit-
ting payoffs are smaller than her prior-based expected continuation payoff, ie. in the so-called
‘preplay’-phase of the game.) Again, the argument for a deviation by P2 is symmetric.
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Proof of lemma 3. The players’ beliefs after observing their own signals ϕi = pr(s−i = s¯|si),
i = 1, 2, are given by
ϕ1
1
= p1 + p2 − 2p1p2, ϕ
1
2
= (1− p1)p2 + p1(1− p2),
ϕ¯11 = p1p2 + (1− p1)(1− p2), ϕ¯
1
2 = (1− p1)(1− p2) + p1p2.
Then the above claim follows from the definitions of the object’s expectations
E¯
2
1 =
θ¯(1− p1)p2
p1 + p2 − 2p1p2
, E =
θ¯(1− p1)(1− p2)
(1− p1)(1− p2) + p1p2)
E¯ =
θ¯p1p2
p1p2 + (1− p1)(1− p2)
, E¯
1
2 =
θ¯p1(1− p2)
p1 + p2 − 2p1p2


E2 = (1− ϕ
1
2
)E+ ϕ1
2
E¯
1
2 = (1− p2)θ¯,
E1 = (1− ϕ
1
1
)E+ ϕ1
1
E¯
2
1 = (1− p1)θ¯
since
E > E¯⇔ p1p2 > (1− p1)(1− p2), E¯
1
2 > E¯
2
1 ⇔ p1 > p2,
E¯
2
1 > E because, if not, 2p2 <
p1
1 + p1
which is a contradiction, and
E¯ > E¯
1
2 because, if not, 2p1 <
p2
1 + p2
which is a contradiction.
Proof of lemma 4. Because we are interested in finding the highest possible continuation bid, we
assume that players’ beliefs are ϕi = 1, ie. they believe in high-type opponents with probability
1. Fig. 1 shows the terminal (quitting-)payoffs for odd and even tf = ⌊E¯⌋−J1−J2. These time-t
quitting stage payoffs are obtained through summation as10
1u
t(q) =
(
t− 1
2
+ J t−12 ,E(s)−
t− 1
2
− J t−12
)
if P1 quits (odd t),
2u
t(q) =
(
E(s)−
t
2
− J t−11 ,
t
2
+ J t−11
)
if P2 quits (even t)
(A.1)
where J ti =
∑
t j
t
i is the sum of player i’s jump bids over the minimum increment before t. If
no player quits, one bidder must eventually bid the highest possible bid B¯. Suppose that Pi
makes this last admissible continuation bid bt˜i = B¯ ≥ θ¯ > E(s) at some period t˜. Then, at t˜ + 1,
P−imust accept Pi’s offer, quit with probability 1 and obtain
1u
t˜+1(q) =
(
t˜
2
+ J t˜2,E(s)−
t˜
2
− J t˜2
)
, 2u
t˜+1(q) =
(
E(s)−
t˜+ 1
2
− J t˜1,
t˜+ 1
2
+ J t˜1
)
.
Knowing this,
P1 quits at t˜ if
t˜− 1
2
+ J t˜−12 > E(s)−
t˜− 1
2
− J t˜1
P2 quits at t˜ if
t˜
2
+ J t˜−11 > E(s)−
t˜
2
− J t˜2
(A.2)
both resulting in the quitting condition t˜ > E(s)−J t˜1−J
t˜
2. Plugging b
t˜
i = B¯ =
∑
t˜ g
t
i = t˜+J
t˜
1+J
t˜
2
10 To facilitate readability of this and the following two lemmata, we occasionally prefix payoffs by the player
index to indicate the player who is about to move, eg. 1u
t
2(q) denotes P2’s payoff from P1 quitting at t.
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back into (A.2), we obtain B¯−J t˜1−J
t˜
2 > E(s)−J
t˜
1−J
t˜
2 or B¯ > E(s)which is true by assumption.
Folding back t = t˜− 1 yields the desired result. We consequently define
tf = ⌊E¯⌋ − J
t−1
1 − J
t−1
2 (A.3)
as the period of the last (ie. highest) equilibrium continuation bid of the game. Any player
moving after tf quits with probability 1.
t = tf − 1 t = tf t = tf + 1
s
s¯2
1
P2 P1 P2
⌊E¯⌋ − 1 ⌊E¯⌋
−
tf − 1
2
− J
tf−1
2
tf + 1
2
+ J
tf
1
⌊E¯⌋ − 1 ⌊E¯⌋
−
tf − 1
2
+ J
tf−1
2
tf + 1
2
+ J
tf
1
q
(·,
tf − 1
2
+ J
tf−2
1
)
q
(
tf − 1
2
+ J
tf−1
2
, ·)
q
(·,
tf + 1
2
+ J
tf
1
)
q
(E¯2
1
−
tf − 1
2
− J
tf−2
1
, ·)
q
(·, E¯2
1
−
tf − 1
2
− J
tf−1
2
)
q
(E¯2
1
−
tf + 1
2
+ J
tf
1
, ·)
s¯1
2
s¯
q
(·,
tf − 1
2
+ J
tf−2
1
)
q
(
tf − 1
2
+ J
tf−1
2
, ·)
q
(·,
tf + 1
2
+ J
tf
1
)
q
(E¯−
tf − 1
2
− J
tf−2
1
, ·)
q
(·, E¯−
tf − 1
2
− J
tf−1
2
)
q
(E¯−
tf + 1
2
+ J
tf
1
, ·)
t = tf − 1 t = tf t = tf + 1
s
s¯2
1
P1 P2 P1
⌊E¯⌋ − 1 ⌊E¯⌋
tf
2
+ J
tf−1
1
−
tf
2
− J
tf
2
⌊E¯⌋ − 1 ⌊E¯⌋
tf
2
+ J
tf−1
1
−
tf
2
− J
tf
2
q
(
tf − 2
2
+ J
tf−2
2
, ·)
q
(·,
tf
2
+ J
tf−1
1
)
q
(
tf
2
+ J
tf
2
, ·)
q
(·, E¯2
1
−
tf − 2
2
− J
tf−2
2
)
q
(E¯2
1
−
tf
2
− J
tf−1
1
, ·)
q
(·, E¯2
1
−
tf
2
− J
tf
2
)
s¯1
2
s¯
q
(
tf − 2
2
+ J
tf−2
2
, ·)
q
(·,
tf
2
+ J
tf−1
1
)
q
(
tf
2
+ J
tf
2
, ·)
q
(·, E¯−
tf − 2
2
− J
tf−2
2
)
q
(E¯−
tf
2
− J
tf−1
1
, ·)
q
(·, E¯−
tf
2
− J
tf
2
)
Figure 1: The endgame for odd tf (left) and the ‘dual’ endgame for even tf (right).
Proof of lemma 5. We define At = {bti ∈ B|b
t−1
−i < b
t
i ≤ E¯} ∪ {q}, the set of feasible bids at t not
exceeding the highest equilibrium bid.
1. Atf+1 = {q}. At t = tf + 1 and all later periods, the moving player quits with payoffs
1u
tf+1(q) =
(
tf
2
+ J
tf
2 ,E(s)−
tf
2
− J
tf
2
)
, 2u
tf+1(q) =
(
E(s)−
tf + 1
2
− J
tf
1 ,
tf + 1
2
+ J
tf
1
)
.
2. Atf = {q, ⌊E¯⌋}. At t = tf , players have the following options (from fig. 1)
P1:
1u
tf (q) =
(
tf − 1
2
+ J
tf−1
2 ,E(s)−
tf − 1
2
− J
tf−1
2
)
,
1u
tf (⌊E¯⌋) = 2u
tf+1(q) =
(
E(s)−
tf + 1
2
− J
tf
1 ,
tf + 1
2
+ J
tf
1
)
,
P2:
2u
tf (q) =
(
E(s)−
tf
2
− J
tf−1
1 ,
tf
2
+ J
tf−1
1
)
,
2u
tf (⌊E¯⌋) = 1u
tf+1(q) =
(
tf
2
+ J
tf
2 ,E(s)−
tf
2
− J
tf
2
)
.
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(a) P1 chooses q over ⌊E¯⌋ if
1u
tf
1 (q|s1) =
tf − 1
2
+ J
tf−1
2 > E1 −
tf − 1
2
− J
tf
1 = 2u
tf+1
1 (q|s1)
⌊E¯⌋ = tf + J
tf
1 + J
tf−1
2 > E1 = ϕ
tf
1 E¯
2
1 + (1− ϕ
tf
1 )E
ϕ
tf
1 <
⌊E¯⌋ − E
E¯
2
1 − E
which is true whenever ⌊E¯⌋ > E¯
2
1.
(b) P1 chooses ⌊E¯⌋ over q if
1u
tf
1 (q|s¯1) =
tf − 1
2
+ J
tf−1
2 < E¯
1
−
tf − 1
2
− J
tf
1 = 2u
tf+1
1 (q|s¯1)
⌊E¯⌋ = tf + J
tf
1 + J
tf−1
2 < E¯
1
= ϕ¯
tf
1 E¯+ (1− ϕ¯
tf
1 )E¯
1
2
ϕ¯
tf
1 >
⌊E¯⌋ − E¯
1
2
E¯− E¯
1
2
.
A simple sufficient condition for this to hold is to require the same already of P1’s
prior. Then, by inserting the definitions of the object’s expectations and beliefs from
the proof of lemma 3, we explore the knife-edge case of
ϕ¯11 =
⌊E¯⌋ − E¯
1
2
E¯− E¯
1
2
p1p2 + (1− p1)(1− p2) =
⌊E¯⌋ − θ¯p1(1−p2)
p1+p2−2p1p2
θ¯p1p2
(1−p1)(1−p2)+p1p2
− θ¯p1(1−p2)
p1+p2−2p1p2
⌊E¯⌋ =
⌊
θ¯p1p2
(1− p1)(1− p2) + p1p2
⌋
= p1θ¯
(A.4)
which is solved by p1 = 1, p2 =
1/2. Any mixing at all along the equilibrium path
will increase this solution set to two intervals and a qualifying p can always be found
if there is at least one mixture period in the game which strictly increases the belief
above the prior ϕ¯11. Precisely this is assumed by assumption 2.
(c) P2 chooses q over ⌊E¯⌋ if
2u
tf
2 (q|s2) =
tf
2
+ J
tf−1
1 > E2 −
tf
2
− J
tf
2 = 1u
tf+1
2 (q|s2)
⌊E¯⌋ = tf + J
tf−1
1 + J
tf
2 > E2 = ϕ2
tf E¯
1
2 + (1− ϕ
tf
2 )E
ϕ
tf
2 <
⌊E¯⌋ − E
E¯
1
2 − E
which is true whenever ⌊E¯⌋ > E¯
1
2.
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(d) P2 chooses ⌊E¯⌋ over q if
2u
tf
2 (q|s¯2) =
tf
2
+ J
tf−1
1 < E¯
2
−
tf
2
− J
tf
2 = 2u
tf+1
1 (q|s¯2)
⌊E¯⌋ = tf + J
tf−1
1 + J
tf
2 < E¯
2
= ϕ¯
tf
2 E¯+ (1− ϕ¯
tf
2 )E¯
2
1
ϕ¯
tf
2 >
⌊E¯⌋ − E¯
2
1
E¯− E¯
2
1
(A.5)
which can be ensured through mixing for the same reason as in (b).
Thus low types quit for certain from lemma 3 and the assumption on the bidding grid
that ⌊E¯⌋ > E¯
1
2 > E¯
2
1. The above sufficiency conditions under which high types continue
with probability 1 guarantee that, for ⌊E¯⌋ < E¯, there always exists an equilibrium β∗.
These conditions are, however, far from necessary. The necessary and sufficient condi-
tions which are stated in assumption 2 are arrived at as follows: For odd ⌊E¯⌋ we first
calculate ϕ
tf
1 from the equilibrium continuation probabilities α
t
1 in (2.3) and Bayes’ rule
(2.4). (This is done explicitly in proposition 1.) Since it does not matter when the signal
s1 arrives, we can transform this low type’s belief into the high type’s belief by applying
ϕ¯t1 = ϕ¯1(ϕ
t
1
) =
ϕt
1
pr(s¯1, s¯2) pr(s1, s2)
ϕt
1
pr(s¯1, s¯2) pr(s1, s2) + (1− ϕ
t
1
) pr(s¯1, s2) pr(s1, s¯2)
and then assuming that the final ϕ¯
tf
1 is sufficiently large. This results in condition (3.1)
which indeed ensures that P1 continues. For even ⌊E¯⌋ we similarly calculate ϕ
tf
2 from
the equilibrium αt2 in (2.1) and Bayes’ rule (2.2), convert the resulting belief into the high-
type’s and ensure continuation by requiring ϕ¯2(ϕ
⌊E¯⌋
2
) >
⌊E¯⌋−E¯
2
1
E¯−E¯
2
1
.
Thus under assumption 2, at the final equilibriumperiod of the game, high types continue
and low types exit with probability 1.
3. Atf−1 = {q, ⌊E¯⌋ − 1, ⌊E¯⌋}. In this step at t = tf − 1 we formulate the payoffs from a jump
deviation jti in terms of t˜f = tf − j
t
i , the shortening of the game relative to the equilibrium
duration due to the jump and J˜i = Ji + j
t
i , the (stage) payoff consequence of the jump.
The idea is that the same can be done with all previous-period deviations, thereby trans-
forming payoffs already on the backward induction path into their (t˜f , J˜)-versions. As
apparent from the formulation of quitting payoffs (A.1) and their equivalents below, the
(t˜f , J˜)-versions cannot exceed the backward induction payoffs.
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Players have the following pure options at period tf − 1 (from fig. 1)
P1:
1u
tf−1(q) =
(
tf − 2
2
+ J
tf−2
2 ,E(s)−
tf − 2
2
− J
tf−2
2
)
,
1u
tf−1(⌊E¯⌋ − 1) = 2u
tf (β∗),
1u
tf−1(⌊E¯⌋) = 2u
t˜f+1(q) =
(
E(s)−
t˜f + 1
2
− J˜
t˜f−1
1 ,
t˜f + 1
2
+ J˜
t˜f−1
1
)
,
=
(
E(s)−
tf + 2
2
− J
tf−2
1 ,
tf + 2
2
+ J
tf−2
1
)
P2:
2u
tf−1(q) =
(
E(s)−
tf − 1
2
− J
tf−2
1 ,
tf − 1
2
+ J
tf−2
1
)
,
2u
tf−1
2 (⌊E¯⌋ − 1) = 1u
tf (β∗),
2u
tf−1
2 (⌊E¯⌋) = 1u
t˜f+1(β∗ = q) =
(
t˜f
2
+ J˜
t˜f−1
2 ,E(s)−
t˜f
2
− J˜
t˜f−1
2
)
=
(
tf + 1
2
+ J
tf−2
2 ,E(s)−
tf + 1
2
− J
tf−2
2
)
(a) P1 mixes between q and ⌊E¯⌋ − 1 if 1u
tf−1
1 (q) = 1u
tf−1
1 (⌊E¯⌋ − 1) or
tf − 2
2
+ J
tf−2
2 = (1− ϕ
tf−1
1
)
[
E−
tf
2
− J
tf−1
1
]
+ ϕtf−1
1
[
tf
2
+ J
tf
2
]
resulting in the terminal low-type belief condition fixing the backward-chain for
even ⌊E¯⌋
ϕtf−1
1
=
E− tf − J
tf−1
1 − J
tf−2
2 + 1
E− tf − J
tf−1
1 − J
tf
2
=
⌊E¯⌋ − E− 1
⌊E¯⌋ − E
. (A.6)
P1 jumps j
tf−1
1 = 1 if 1u
tf−1
1 (⌊E¯⌋) > 1u
tf−1
1 (q) or
E(s1)−
t˜f + 1
2
− J˜
t˜f
1 = E(s1)−
tf
2
− J
tf−3
1 − j
tf−1
1 >
tf − 2
2
+ J
tf−2
2
⌊E¯⌋ = tf + J
tf−3
1 + J
tf−2
2 < E(s1)
which is impossible. Hence for suitable beliefs P1 is willing to mix.
(b) P1 quits if 1u
tf−1
1 (q) > 1u
tf−1
1 (⌊E¯⌋ − 1) or
tf − 2
2
+ J
tf−2
2 > (1− ϕ¯
tf−1
1 )
[
E¯
1
2 −
tf
2
− J
tf−1
1
]
+ ϕ¯
tf−1
1
[
tf
2
+ J
tf
2
]
ϕ¯
tf−1
1 <
E¯− E¯
1
2 − 1
E¯− E¯
1
2
contradicting (A.6) because ϕ¯ti > ϕ
t
i
. So if P1 mixes at tf − 1 (as assumed), then P1
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cannot quit with positive probability. P1 jumps if 1u
tf−1
1 (⌊E¯⌋) > 1u
tf−1
1 (⌊E¯⌋ − 1) or
E(s¯1)−
t˜f + 1
2
− J˜
t˜f
1 = E(s¯1)−
tf
2
− J
tf−3
1 − j
tf−1
1 >
(1− ϕ¯
tf−1
1 )
[
E¯
1
2 −
tf
2
− J
tf−1
1
]
+ ϕ¯
tf−1
1
[
tf
2
+ J
tf
2
]
resulting in the two conditions
(1− ϕ¯
tf−1
1 )
[
E¯
1
2 −
tf
2
− J
tf−3
1 − 1
]
> (1− ϕ¯
tf−1
1 )
[
E¯
1
2 −
tf
2
− J
tf−1
1
]
,
ϕ¯
tf−1
1
[
E¯−
tf
2
− J
tf−3
1 − 1
]
> ϕ¯
tf−1
1
[
tf
2
+ J
tf
2
]
⇔ E¯ > ⌊E¯⌋+ 1
which are both impossible to satisfy. Hence P1 continues with probability 1.
(c) P2 mixes between q and ⌊E¯⌋ − 1 if 2u
tf−1
2 (q) = 2u
tf−1
2 (⌊E¯⌋ − 1) or
tf − 2
2
+ J
tf−2
1 = (1− ϕ
tf−1
2
)
[
E−
tf − 1
2
− J
tf−1
2
]
+ ϕtf−1
2
[
tf + 1
2
+ J
tf
1
]
resulting in the familiar terminal low-type belief condition fixing the backward-
chain for odd ⌊E¯⌋
ϕtf−1
2
=
E− tf − J
tf−2
1 − J
tf−1
2 + 1
E− tf − J
tf
1 − J
tf−1
2
=
⌊E¯⌋ − E− 1
⌊E¯⌋ − E
. (A.7)
P2 jumps j
tf−1
2 = 1 if 2u
tf−1
2 (⌊E¯⌋) > 2u
tf−1
2 (q) or
E(s2)−
t˜f
2
− J˜
t˜f
2 = E(s2)−
tf − 1
2
− J
tf−3
2 − j
tf−1
2 >
tf − 1
2
+ J
tf−2
1
⌊E¯⌋ = tf + J
tf−2
1 + J
tf−3
2 < E(s2)
which is impossible. Hence for suitable beliefs P2 mixes.
(d) P2 quits if 2u
tf−1
2 (q) > 2u
tf−1
2 (⌊E¯⌋ − 1) or
tf − 1
2
+ J
tf−2
1 > (1− ϕ¯
tf−1
2 )
[
E−
tf − 1
2
− J
tf−1
2
]
+ ϕ¯
tf−1
2
[
tf + 1
2
+ J
tf
1
]
ϕ¯
tf−1
2 <
⌊E¯⌋ − E¯
2
1 − 1
⌊E¯⌋ − E¯
2
1
contradicting (A.7) because ϕ¯ti > ϕ
t
i
and P2 will not quit with positive probability.
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P2 jumps if 2u
tf−1
2 (⌊E¯⌋) > 2u
tf−1
2 (⌊E¯⌋ − 1) or
E(s¯2)−
t˜f
2
− J˜
t˜f
2 = E(s¯2)−
tf − 1
2
− J
tf−3
2 − j
tf−1
2 >
(1− ϕ¯
tf−1
2 )
[
E¯
2
1 −
tf − 1
2
− J
tf−1
2
]
+ ϕ¯
tf−1
2
[
tf + 1
2
+ J
tf
1
]
resulting in the two contradictions
(1− ϕ¯
tf−1
2 )
[
E¯
2
1 −
tf − 1
2
− J
tf−3
2 − 1
]
> (1− ϕ¯
tf−1
2 )
[
E¯
2
1 −
tf − 1
2
− J
tf−1
2
]
,
ϕ¯
tf−1
2
[
E¯−
tf − 1
2
− J
tf−3
2 − 1
]
> ϕ¯
tf−1
2
[
tf + 1
2
+ J
tf
1
]
⇔ E¯ > ⌊E¯⌋+ 1.
Hence P2 continues with probability 1.
4. Atf−2 = {q, ⌊E¯⌋ − 2, ⌊E¯⌋ − 1, ⌊E¯⌋}. We avoid to list the pure continuation actions for the
high types at t = tf − 2which are virtually identical to those in the previous step. We do,
however, state the mixture and deviation conditions for the low types which confirm the
equilibrium stage mixture conditions (2.1) and (2.3).
(a) P1 mixes between q and ⌊E¯⌋ − 2 if 1u
tf−2
1 (q) = 1u
tf−2
1 (⌊E¯⌋ − 2) or
tf − 3
2
+ J
tf−3
2 = (1− ϕ
tf−2
1 )
[
(1− α
tf−1
2 )
(
E−
tf − 1
2
− J
tf−2
1
)
+ α
tf−1
2
(
tf − 1
2
+ J
tf−1
2
)]
+ ϕ
tf−2
1
[
tf − 1
2
+ J
tf−1
2
]
giving the stage mixing condition (2.1)
α
tf−1
2 =
(1− ϕ
tf−2
1 )
(
tf + J
tf−2
1 + J
tf−1
2 − E− 1
)
− j
tf−3
2 − 1
(1− ϕ
tf−2
1 )
(
tf + J
tf−2
1 + J
tf−1
2 − E− 1
)
=
(1− ϕ
tf−2
1 )(⌊E¯⌋ − E− 1)− 1
(1− ϕ
tf−2
1 )(⌊E¯⌋ − E− 1)
in equilibrium.
(b) P1 jumps j
tf−2
1 = 2 (hence t˜f = tf − 2 and J˜
t˜f−2
1 = J
t˜f−2
1 + 2) if 1u
tf−2
1 (⌊E¯⌋) >
1u
tf−2
1 (⌊E¯⌋ − 2) or, for 1u
tf−1
1 (β
∗) = E¯
1
2 −
tf + 1
2
− J
tf
1 ,
1u
tf−1
1 (⌊E¯⌋) = 2u
t˜f+1
1 (q) = E(s1)−
t˜f + 1
2
− J˜
t˜f
1 = E(s1)−
tf + 3
2
− J
tf−4
1 =
(1− ϕ
tf−2
1 )
[
E−
tf + 3
2
− J
tf−4
1
]
+ ϕ
tf−2
1
[
E¯
2
1 −
tf + 3
2
− J
tf−4
1
]
>
(1− ϕ
tf−2
1 )
[
(1− α
tf−1
2 )
(
E−
tf − 1
2
− J
tf−2
1
)
+ α
tf−1
2
(
tf − 1
2
+ J
tf−1
2
)]
+ϕ
tf−2
1
[
E¯−
tf + 1
2
− J
tf
1
]
= 1u
tf−2
1 (⌊E¯⌋ − 2)
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leading to the low-signal condition
E−
tf + 3
2
− J
tf−4
1 > (1− α
tf−1
2 )
(
E−
tf − 1
2
− J
tf−2
1
)
+ α
tf−1
2
(
tf − 1
2
+ J
tf−1
2
)
which cannot be satisfied. Neither can the second, high-signal condition hold
E¯
2
1 −
tf + 3
2
− J
tf−4
1 >
tf − 1
2
− J
tf−1
1 ⇔ E¯
2
1 − 1 > ⌊E¯⌋ = tf + J
tf−4
1 + J
tf−1
2 .
Thus a jump of j
tf−2
1 = 2 is not profitable for P1.
(c) P1 jumps j
tf−2
1 = 1 (hence t˜f = tf − 1 and J˜
t˜f−2
1 = J
t˜f−2
1 + 1) if 1u
tf−2
1 (⌊E¯⌋ − 1) >
1u
tf−2
1 (⌊E¯⌋ − 2) or
1u
tf−1
1 (E¯− 1) = 2u
t˜f
1 (β
∗) = (1− ϕ
tf−2
1 )
[
E−
tf − 1
2
− J
tf−4
1 − 1
]
+ ϕ
tf−2
1
[
tf − 1
2
+ J
tf−1
2
]
>
(1− ϕ
tf−2
1 )
[
(1− α
tf−1
2 )
(
E−
tf − 1
2
− J
tf−2
1
)
+ α
tf−1
2
(
tf − 1
2
+ J
tf−1
2
)]
+ϕ
tf−2
1
[
tf − 1
2
+ J
tf−1
2
]
= 1u
tf−2
1 (⌊E¯⌋ − 2)
resulting in the low-signal condition
E−
tf + 1
2
− J
tf−4
1 > (1− α
tf−1
2 )
(
E−
tf − 1
2
− J
tf−2
1
)
+ α
tf−1
2
(
tf − 1
2
+ J
tf−1
2
)
which cannot be satisfied. For the second, high-signal condition is
tf − 1
2
+ J
tf−1
2 >
tf − 1
2
+ J
tf−1
2 for which again a jump of j
tf−2
1 = 1 cannot be profitable.
(d) P1 prefers minimally increasing with probability 1 over quitting as in period tf − 1.
(e) P1 jumps j
tf−2
1 = 2 implying t˜f = tf − 2 and J˜
t˜f−2
1 = J
t˜f−2
1 + 2 if 1u
tf−2
1 (⌊E¯⌋) >
1u
tf−2
1 (⌊E¯⌋ − 2) or, for
1u¯
tf−1
1 (β
∗) = E¯
1
2 −
tf + 1
2
− J
tf
1 ,
1u¯
tf−1
1 (⌊E¯⌋) = 2u
t˜f+1
1 (q) = E(s¯1)−
t˜f + 1
2
− J˜
t˜f
1 = E(s¯1)−
tf + 3
2
− J
tf−4
1 =
(1− ϕ¯
tf−2
1 )
[
E¯
1
2 −
tf + 3
2
− J
tf−4
1
]
+ ϕ
tf−2
1
[
E¯−
tf + 3
2
− J
tf−4
1
]
>
(1− ϕ¯
tf−2
1 )
[
(1− α
tf−1
2 )
(
E¯
1
2 −
tf − 1
2
− J
tf−2
1
)
+ α
tf−1
2
(
E¯
1
2 −
tf + 1
2
− J
tf
1
)]
+ϕ
tf−2
1
[
E¯−
tf + 1
2
− J
tf
1
]
= 1u
tf−2
1 (⌊E¯⌋ − 2)
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leading to both
E¯
1
2 −
tf + 3
2
− J
tf−4
1 > (1− α
tf−1
2 )
(
E¯
1
2 −
tf − 1
2
− J
tf−2
1
)
+ α
tf−1
2
(
E¯
1
2 −
tf + 1
2
− J
tf
1
)
,
and E¯−
tf + 3
2
− J
tf−4
1 > E¯−
tf + 1
2
− J
tf
1
which cannot hold. Hence a jump of j
tf−2
1 = 2 is not profitable for P1.
(f) P1 jumps j
tf−2
1 = 1 implying t˜f = tf − 1 and J˜
t˜f−2
1 = J
t˜f−2
1 + 1 if 1u
tf−2
1 (⌊E¯⌋ − 1) >
1u
tf−2
1 (⌊E¯⌋ − 2) or, for
1u¯
tf−1
1 (E¯− 1) = 2u
t˜f
1 (β
∗) = (1− ϕ¯
tf−2
1 )
[
E¯
1
2 −
t˜f
2
− J˜
t˜f−1
1
]
+ ϕ¯
tf−2
1
[
t˜f
2
+ J˜
t˜f
2
]
= (1− ϕ¯
tf−2
1 )
[
E¯
1
2 −
tf − 1
2
− J
tf−4
1 − 1
]
+ ϕ¯
tf−2
1
[
tf − 1
2
+ J
tf−1
2
]
>
(1− ϕ¯
tf−2
1 )
[
(1− α
tf−1
2 )
(
E¯
1
2 −
tf − 1
2
− J
tf−2
1
)
+ α
tf−1
2
(
E¯
1
2 −
tf + 1
2
− J
tf
1
)]
+ϕ
tf−2
1
[
E¯−
tf + 1
2
− J
tf
1
]
= 1u
tf−2
1 (⌊E¯⌋ − 2)
leading again to the two unfulfillable conditions
E¯
1
2 −
tf
2
−
1
2
− J
tf−4
1 > (1− α
tf−1
2 )
(
E¯
1
2 −
tf − 1
2
− J
tf−2
1
)
+ α
tf−1
2
(
E¯
1
2 −
tf + 1
2
− J
tf
1
)
,
and
tf − 1
2
+ J
tf−1
2 > E¯−
tf + 1
2
− J
tf
1 ⇔ ⌊E¯⌋ > E¯
rendering a jump of j
tf−2
1 = 1 unprofitable for P1.
(g)–(h) The stage-tf − 2 conditions for P2 are very similar to those for P1. Thus we only
derive P2’s mixing condition between q and ⌊E¯⌋ − 2.
P2 mixes if 2u
tf−2
2 (q) = 2u
tf−2
2 (⌊E¯⌋ − 2) or
tf − 2
2
+ J
tf−3
1 = (1− ϕ
tf−2
2 )
[
(1− α
tf−1
1 )
(
E−
tf − 2
2
− J
tf−2
2
)
+ α
tf−1
1
(
tf
2
+ J
tf−1
1
)]
+ ϕ
tf−2
2
[
tf
2
+ J
tf−1
1
]
resulting in the stage mixing condition (2.3)
α
tf−1
1 =
(1− ϕ
tf−2
2 )
(
tf + J
tf−1
1 + J
tf−2
2 − E− 1
)
− j
tf−3
1 − 1
(1− ϕ
tf−2
1 )
(
tf + J
tf−1
1 + J
tf−2
2 − E− 1
)
=
(1− ϕ
tf−2
2 )(⌊E¯⌋ − E− 1)− 1
(1− ϕ
tf−2
2 )(⌊E¯⌋ − E− 1)
in equilibrium.
Thus given suitable beliefs, all stage actions are as specified by β∗.
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5. At = {q, ⌊E¯⌋−t, . . . , ⌊E¯⌋}. At general ts < t < tf−1we show that a mixed or pure minimal
increase action is optimal. As in the previous backward induction step, we formulate the
payoffs after a jump jti in terms of t˜f = tf − j
t
i , the shortening of the game relative to the
equilibrium duration due to the jump, and J˜i = Ji + j
t
i , the (stage) payoff consequence
of the jump. Any continuation action at t leads to a situation where the opponent faces a
feasible setAt+1 which is smaller than the setAt. Following a jumpwith even jti , the same
feasible choice set At˜+1 is already on the equilibrium backward induction path leading to
the node at t. For odd-valued jumps jti , the feasible choice set A
t˜+1 is on the equilibrium
backward induction path of a dual game which is identical to QB but has P2 start the
game. These payoffs, however, are modified by tf = t˜f − j
t
i and J˜
t˜f
i . (If the action at
t+ 1 is mixed, we need to consider both the (1− αt+1)-weighed t+ 1-quitting payoff and
the the αt+1-weighed t + 2-continuation payoff. For a pure action, the t + 2-continuation
payoff suffices.) Relative to the quitting payoffs obtained on the equilibrium path, t˜f
increases −iui(q) and J˜i reduces the deviation −iu˜(q)while leaving all iu(q) unchanged for
all periods following the deviation. Since t˜f carries only half the payoff-weight of J˜i, the
overall effect of a jump on future quitting payoffs cannot be positive.
(a) P1: The continuation payoffs u¯t+21 (β) from increasing minimally and from jumping
jt1 are given by backward induction through the previous steps. The (t˜, J˜i)-version is
lower than the minimal increase version. We consider a general period t, xminimal
bids ahead of ⌊E¯⌋ and look at P1’s stage decision. P1 expects the following payoff
u¯t1(β) = (1− ϕ¯
t
i)
[
(1− αt+12 )
(
θ¯ −
t+ 1
2
− J t1
)
+ αt+12 u
t+2
1 (β)
]
+ ϕ¯tiu¯
t+2
1 (A.8)
which, for αt+12 as defined in (2.1) as
αt+12 =
(1− ϕt
1
)(t+ J t1 + J
t+1
2 − E+ 1)− j
t−1
2 − 1
(1− ϕt
1
)(t+ J t1 + J
t+1
2 − E+ 1)
,
equals
(1− ϕ¯t1)

1−
(1− ϕt
1
)(t+ J t1 + J
t+1
2 − E+ 1)− j
t−1
2 − 1
(1− ϕt
1
)(t+ J t1 + J
t+1
2 − E+ 1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
decreasing in jt1
(
E¯
1
2 −
t+ 1
2
− J t1
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
decreasing in jt1
+
(1− ϕt
1
)(t+ J t1 + J
t+1
2 − E+ 1)− j
t−1
2 − 1
(1− ϕt
1
)(t+ J t1 + J
t+1
2 − E+ 1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
increasing in jt1
u¯t+21 (β)

+ ϕ¯t1u¯t+21 (β).
where J t1 = j
1
1 + j
3
1 + · · · + j
t
1 is increasing in any jump j
t
1 at t. Since the continua-
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tion payoff ut+21 (β) is pinned down by a previous equilibrium backward induction
step with all future quitting payoffs and continuation probabilities α2 replaced by
their (t˜f , J˜i)-formulations exhibiting the same monotonicity as (A.8), we know that
ut+21 (β) is decreased by a jump j
t
1 > 0 by P1. Thus u
t
1(·) is strictly decreasing in
jt1 and P1 finds it optimal to increase his bids minimally by setting j
t
1 = 0 for all
ts < t < tf − 1.
The intuition is that for s¯12, P1 wants P2 to quit as early as possible in order to min-
imise his payments for the object worth E¯
1
2. In case of s¯, P2 only quits at the final
stage and thus the players share the object’s value half-half.
(b) P1 is made indifferent at each stage, whatever the choice of continuation action,
because P2 ensures this through mixing appropriately at the following stage. She is
willing to mix because, from lemma 1, she must be indifferent between continuing
and quitting herself. Since P1 is thus made indifferent between any continuation
action and quitting, he cannot profit from jumping. The same holds for P2.
(c) In an argument which fully parallels (a), P2 gets
u¯t2(β) = (1− ϕ¯
t
2)
[
(1− αt+11 )
(
E¯
2
1 −
t
2
− J t2
)
+ αt+11 u
t+2
2 (β)
]
+ ϕ¯t2u¯
t+2
2 (β)
which equals for αt+11 defined in (2.3)
(1− ϕ¯t2)

1−
(1− ϕt
2
)(t+ J t+11 + J
t
2 − E+ 1)− j
t−1
1 − 1
(1− ϕt
2
)(t+ J t+11 + J
t
2 − E+ 1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
decreasing in jt2
(
E¯
2
1 −
t
2
− J t2
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
decreasing in jt1
+
(1− ϕt
2
)(t+ J t+11 + J
t
2 − E+ 1)− j
t−1
1 − 1
(1− ϕt
2
)(t+ J t+11 + J
t
2 − E+ 1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
increasing in jt1
u¯t+22 (β)

+ ϕ¯t2u¯t+22 (β).
Thus again ut2(·) is strictly decreasing in j
t
2 and P2 finds it optimal to increase her
bids minimally by setting jt2 = 0 for all ts < t < tf − 1.
Proof of lemma 6. The previous lemma pins down continuation payoffs for periods from the last
possible equilibrium continuation action at tf backward to ts. Again we have to distinguish the
cases of odd and even ⌊E¯⌋. In equilibrium for odd ⌊E¯⌋, we know that P2 is the last player to
mix at period tf − 1. Therefore we need a first mixture by P1 at period ts in order to uniquely
define all αti and ϕ
t
i of the main game. Conversely, for even ⌊E¯⌋, P1 is the last player to mix in
β∗ and the first player to mix at period ts must be P2. Apart from this role reversal, the two
cases are identical. Thus we only look at the case of odd ⌊E¯⌋—illustrated in fig. 2—in detail.
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t = ts t = ts + 1 t = ts + 2
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s¯
2
1
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ts ts + 1
ts ts + 1q
(
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2
, E−
ts − 1
2
)
q
(E−
ts + 1
2
,
ts + 1
2
)
q
(
ts + 1
2
, E−
ts + 1
2
)
q
(
ts − 1
2
, E¯2
1
−
ts − 1
2
)
q
(E¯2
1
−
ts + 1
2
,
ts + 1
2
)
q
(
ts + 1
2
, E¯2
1
−
ts + 1
2
)
s¯
1
2
s¯
q
(
ts − 1
2
, E¯1
2
−
ts − 1
2
)
q
(E¯1
2
−
ts + 1
2
,
ts + 1
2
)
q
(
ts + 1
2
, E¯1
2
−
ts + 1
2
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q
(
ts − 1
2
, E¯−
ts − 1
2
)
q
(E¯−
ts + 1
2
,
ts + 1
2
)
q
(
ts + 1
2
, E¯−
ts + 1
2
)
Figure 2: The end of the equilibrium ‘preplay’-phase at ts for odd ⌊E¯⌋.
We defined ts + 1 as the first period where P2’s quitting payoff is higher than her prior-
based continuation payoff from the above lemma 5. Thus, if her beliefs are not manipulated
through P1’s mixing, P2 will quit at ts + 1. Conversely, for t < ts, there is no need for P1
to mix and thereby induce P2 to continue bidding up because her prior-based continuation
payoff is already higher than her quitting payoffs. Thus mixing by P1 before ts would lower
his expected payoff because her quitting payoffs are increasing. Thus P1 will not quit with
positive probability before ts and P1 will do the same because ϕ¯1 > ϕ1. Moreover, since no
Pi can gain from mixing, beliefs cannot be modified through preplay jumps. Therefore only
the negative influence of a jump on own future quitting payoffs −iu
t
i(q) for t ≥ ts remains and
hence preplay-phase jumps decrease continuation payoffs.
Thus both players and both types increase own bids minimally and with probability one in
the preplay-phase. Potential equilibria of (jump, jump-back)-type, where the original equilib-
rium payoffs are re-instated by a pair of symmetric preplay-jumps, are excluded because each
player can increase his payoff by unilaterally deviating from such a candidate to a minimal-
increase strategy.
Proof of proposition 1. For odd ⌊E¯⌋, the evolution of P2’s equilibrium belief ϕt
2
determines the
first mixing period of the game. To see why this is the case, notice that—as argued in (A.7) of
the previous lemma—P2’s terminal equilibrium mixing belief must be
ϕ⌊E¯⌋−1
2
=
⌊E¯⌋ − E− 1
⌊E¯⌋ − E
.
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Inserting this into Bayes’ rule and substituting P1’s mixture probability for the equilibrium
(2.1), one finds P2’s even time-t belief by calculating backwards as
∗ϕt
2
=
(((
⌊E¯⌋ − E− 1
⌊E¯⌋ − E
)
⌊E¯⌋ − E− 3
⌊E¯⌋ − E− 2
)
⌊E¯⌋ − E− 5
⌊E¯⌋ − E− 4
)
· · ·
⌊E¯⌋−t
2
times
=
⌊E¯⌋−t+1
2∏
τ=1
⌊E¯⌋ − E− 2τ + 1
⌊E¯⌋ − E− 2τ + 2
which, using the Pochhammer notation Pochhammer(a, n) = Γ(a+n)
Γ(a)
, simplifies to
∗ϕt
2
= ϕt+2
2
t− E
t− E+ 1
=
Pochhammer
(
1−⌊E¯⌋+E
2
, 1−⌊E¯⌋−t
2
)
Pochhammer
(
−⌊E¯⌋+E
2
, 1−⌊E¯⌋−t
2
) . (A.9)
We have found t∗s as soon as this calculated
∗ϕt
2
becomes smaller than the prior ϕts
2
. Since a
closed form solution to (A.9) for ts is—to the author’s knowledge—unavailable, we must use
trial & error simulation techniques. This, however, does not impinge on our analytic existence
argument and the characterisation of the equilibrium strategies. Now calculating from this t∗s
forward, P1’s final period belief is found from ∗ϕt
1
= ϕt−2
1
t−E
t−E+1
as
ϕ⌊E¯⌋
1
= ϕ1
1
Γ
(
⌊E¯⌋−E−ts+4
2
)
Γ
(
⌊E¯⌋−E−ts+3
2
) Γ
(
ts−E
2
)
Γ
(
ts−E+1
2
) . (A.10)
The two resulting conditions (A.9) and (A.10) are the sufficient conditions for the existence of
the equilibrium β∗ as stated by assumption 2. The conditions for even ⌊E¯⌋ are identical for
reversed roles of the players. Given the first mixture period t∗s, the player’s odd ⌊E¯⌋ expected
payoffs are determined as
u1(β
∗|s¯) = E¯− ⌊E¯⌋+1
2
, u2(β
∗|s¯) = ⌊E¯⌋+1
2
,
u1(β
∗|s¯12) = E¯
1
2 − u2(β
∗|s¯12),
u2(β
∗|s¯12) =
⌊E¯⌋−1
2∑
τ= ts+1
2

 τ−1∏
t= ts+1
2
α2t2

u2τ2 (q)(1− α2τ2 ) +


⌊E¯⌋−1
2∏
t=1
α2t2

u⌊E¯⌋2 (q),
u1(β
∗|s¯21) =
⌊E¯⌋+1
2∑
τ= ts+1
2
(
τ−1∏
t=1
α2t−11
)
u2τ−11 (q)(1− α
2τ−1
1 ) +


⌊E¯⌋+1
2∏
t= ts+1
2
α2t−11

u⌊E¯⌋1 (q),
u2(β
∗|s¯21) = E¯
2
1 − u1(β
∗|s¯21), u1(β
∗|s) = E− u2(β
∗|s),
u2(β
∗|s =
⌊E¯⌋−1
2∑
τ= ts+1
2

 τ−1∏
t= ts+1
2
α2t−12 α
2t
2

((1− α2τ−11 )u2τ−12 (q) + α2τ−11 (1− α2τ2 )u2τ2 (q)) .
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Obviously, u1(β
∗|s1) =
ts−1
2
. These payoffs can be directly computed by supplying the equi-
librium continuation probabilities αti and the corresponding beliefs ϕ
t
i from (2.1)–(2.4). For the
case of even-valued ⌊E¯⌋, the expected payoffs are found in the same way.
A.2 Examples
A.2.1 Particular p
We look at the simple example of θ ∈ {0, 5} for the particular, arbitrarily chosen pair of signal
accuracies p = (.8, .75). The set of possible bids is {0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, . . . , B¯}. The true value of
the object is unknown to a player with signal precision p < 1 and thus there is some generic
uncertainty on the object’s value underlying the incomplete information on the opponent’s
signal. Therefore the true realisation of θ is generally not known to a player even if he were to
know the opponent’s signal: Learning the opponent’s signal is the best a player can hope for.
Thus we use signal profiles as states in fig. 3 and not the realisation of θ.
The chosen signal accuracies give rise to the initial beliefs conditional on the own signal
ϕti = pr(s−i = s¯|si). These initial conditional beliefs are calculated from the common priors
ϕ0i =
1/2 using Bayes’ rule as, for instance, for P2
ϕ1
2
= pr(s1|s2) =
pr(s1, s2)
pr(s2)
=
pr(s1, s2|θ) pr(θ) + pr(s1, s2|θ¯) pr(θ¯)
pr(s2|θ) pr(θ) + pr(s2|θ¯) pr(θ¯)
=
pr(s1, s2|θ) + pr(s1, s2|θ¯)
pr(s2|θ) + pr(s2|θ¯)
=
p1p2 + (1− p1)(1− p2)
p2 + (1− p2)
.
Filling in the example values of p = (.8, .75), the above give
ϕ1
1
= p1 + p2 − 2p1p2 = .35, ϕ
1
2
= (1− p1)p2 + p1(1− p2) = .35,
ϕ¯11 = p1p2 + (1− p1)(1− p2) = .65, ϕ¯
1
2 = (1− p1)(1− p2) + p1p2 = .65.
Since the information on the signal accuracies is symmetric and public, the initial ϕ1
1
= ϕ1
2
and
ϕ¯11 = ϕ¯
1
2 must be identical given the same signal. Next we calculate the ‘objective’ expectation
of the object’s value given the different signal combinations. These are
E = θ¯
(1− p1)(1− p2)
(1− p1)(1− p2) + p1p2
= 0.38, E¯
2
1 = θ¯
(1− p1)p2
p1 + p2 − 2p1p2
= 2.14,
E¯
1
2 = θ¯
p1(1− p2)
p1 + p2 − 2p1p2
= 2.86, E¯ = θ¯
p1p2
p1p2 + (1− p1)(1− p2)
= 4.62
giving P2’s ‘subjective’ ex-ante expectation of the object’s value as E2 = ϕ
1
2
E¯
1
2 + (1 − ϕ
1
2
)E =
(1− p2)θ¯ = 1.25.
Following the definition of the equilibrium β∗ in section 2 we impose the low-type mixture
conditions at each stage of the main game and obtain the following continuation probabilities
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from solving the resulting system of inequalities (which is derived below)
β∗b =
(
α11 = 1 α
2
2 = 0.21 α
3
1 = 0.41 α
4
2 = 0 α
5
1 = 0
α¯11 = 1 α¯
2
2 = 1 α¯
3
1 = 1 α¯
4
2 = 1 α¯
5
1 = 0
)
(A.11)
together with the belief system(
ϕ1
1
= .35 ϕ2
2
= .35 ϕ3
1
= .72 ϕ4
2
= .57
ϕ¯11 = .65 ϕ¯
2
2 = .65 ϕ¯
3
1 = .90 ϕ¯
4
2 = .82
)
.
This candidate equilibrium path is marked red in the extensive form of fig 3 where shaded
triangles symbolise mixed actions. To compute the above equilibrium profile, we weigh the
low-type player’s expected continuation payoffs from a profile β at t ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}
uti(β|si) = (1− ϕ
t
i
)
[
(1− αt+1−i )u
t+1
i (q|si, s−i) + α
t+1
−i u
t+2
i (β|si)
]
+ ϕt
i
[
ut+2i (β|si)
]
against the same player’s certain quitting payoff uti(q) =
∑t g−i as defined in lemma 4. These
quitting payoffs are independent of the object’s expected value because they consist solely of
the sum of the opponent’s bidding increases. Notice that it is crucial for the easy solvability of
the game that in the above continuation payoff ut+2i (β|si) = u
t+2
i (q|si) because Pimixes at t+2.
Of course, Pi is willing to mix only if the above quitting and continuation payoffs are equal.
N
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P1
P1
P1
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Figure 3: Partial extensive form for θ ∈ {0, 5} and p = (.8, .75).
The equilibrium dynamics are as follows; first the backward chain: Since P2 quits with prob-
ability one rather than bidding 4, and P2 bids 4 followed by P1 quitting, the terminal belief ϕ3
1
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which makes P1 mix at t = 3 is uniquely determined. There is only a single mixture probabil-
ity α22 which brings about these beliefs through Bayes’ rule and thus this mixture probability is
determined uniquely as well. The forward chain consists just of the indifference condition given
the prior beliefs by P2 at t = 2 generating P1’s mixture probability at t = 3: P2’s indifference
between quitting and minimal continuation uniquely defines the α31 which makes her mix. No-
tice that this does not include the mixing of P1 at tf = 1 (as in the case of odd E¯) because all
probabilities are already uniquely determined. As prescribed by β∗, all high types continue
with probability 1 until the minimal admissible continuation bids exceed ⌈E¯⌉; then they quit.
Checking the player’s equilibrium conditions amounts to setting up the system
low-type P1: t = 1, 0 < (1− ϕ1
1
)
[
(1− α22)(E− 1) + α
2
2(1)
]
+ ϕ1
1
(1)
high-type P1: t = 1, 0 < (1− ϕ¯11)
[
(1− α22)(E¯
1
2 − 1) + α
2
2(1)
]
+ ϕ¯11(2)
low-type P2: t = 2, 1 = (1− ϕ2
2
)
[
(1− α31)(E− 1) + α
3
1(2)
]
+ ϕ2
2
(2)
high-type P2: t = 2, 1 < (1− ϕ¯22)
[
(1− α31)(E¯
2
1 − 1) + α
3
1(2)
]
+ ϕ2
2
(E¯− 2)
BR: t = 3, ϕ3
1
= pr(s¯2|s1, b
2
2 = 2) =
ϕ1
1
ϕ1
1
+ (1− ϕ1
1
)α22
, ϕ¯31 =
ϕ¯11
ϕ¯11 + (1− ϕ¯
1
1)α
1
1
low-type P1: t = 3, 1 = (1− ϕ3
1
)(E− 2) + ϕ3
1
(2)
high-type P1: t = 3, 1 < (1− ϕ¯31)(E¯
1
2 − 2) + ϕ¯
3
1(2)
BR: t = 4, ϕ4
2
= pr(s¯1|s2, b
3
1 = 3) =
ϕ2
2
ϕ2
2
+ (1− ϕ2
2
)α31
, ϕ¯42 =
ϕ¯22
ϕ¯22 + (1− ϕ¯
2
2)α
3
1
low-type P2: t = 4, 2 > (1− ϕ4
2
)(E− 2) + ϕ¯42(E¯
1
2 − 2)
high-type P2: t = 4, 2 < (1− ϕ¯42)(E¯
2
1 − 2) + ϕ¯
4
2(E¯− 2)
BR: t = 5, ϕ5
1
= pr(s¯2|s1, b
4
2 = 4) =
ϕ3
1
ϕ3
1
+ (1− ϕ3
1
)α42
= 1, ϕ¯51 =
ϕ¯31
ϕ¯31 + (1− ϕ¯
3
1)α
4
2
= 1
low-type P1: t = 5, 2 > (E¯
2
1 − 3)
high-type P1: t = 5, 2 > (E¯− 3)
which is solved by (A.11). This, together with an unsuccessful search for deviations,11 confirms
β∗ with probabilities (A.11) as equilibrium of our example. Its expected payoffs are
(s1, s2) (s1, s¯2) (s¯1, s2) (s¯1, s¯2) (s1, ·) (s¯1, ·) (·, s2) (·, s¯2) E[·]
u1(β
∗|s) −.50 1.41 1.65 2.00 0.17 1.88 · · 1.02
u2(β
∗|s) 0.89 0.73 1.21 2.62 · · 1.00 1.96 1.48
.
As pointed out previously, it is not possible to implement β∗ for all pairs of signal accuracies p.
11 In order to confirm that there are no profitable deviations we need to work out the players’ on- and off-
equilibrium path beliefs. This is done in accord with lemmata 1 and 2. What these lemmata say is that both
low-type players must be indifferent between quitting and continuing after each feasible deviation (ie. after
each deviation which does not only allow for subsequent quitting). At the same time, the players’ equilibrium
strategies must state a unique mixture probability in response to each previous period observed action. Since
only a single belief is compatible with actually using the equilibrium response, beliefs are fully determined.
27
As sufficiency condition for existence of β∗, assumption 2 demands that
0.8185 = ϕ¯42 >
⌊E¯⌋ − E¯
2
1
E¯− E¯
2
1
= 0.7511
which ensures that the P2 continues at period ⌊E¯⌋ = 4. It is indeed fulfilled. Likewise, P1’s
period tf − 1 belief allows for his mixing and the grid condition ⌊E¯⌋ > E¯
1
2 holds.
To illustrate a deviation, suppose P2 observes bˆ11 = 2 instead of the equilibrium-prescribed
b11 = 1; then her equilibriummixture condition at t = 2 turns into
2 = (1− ϕˆ2
2
)(E− 1) + ϕˆ2
2
(3) ⇔ ϕˆ2
2
=
3− E
4− E
≈ 0.72 =
ϕ1
2
(1)
ϕ1
2
(1) + (1− ϕ1
2
)αˆ11
resulting in the requirement of P2 believing that the low-type P1’s deviation occurred with
probability αˆ11 ≈ 0.21. Any other belief will result in P2 either continuing or quitting for certain
meaning that P1 could manipulate P2 into doing what is optimal for him. Since P1 would do
this whatever his type, this cannot be equilibrium behaviour.
The lesson from our example is threefold: (i) Players cannot ‘lie’ to their opponent by play-
ing supposedly fully revealing actions because the opponent would not believe such dubious
information. (ii) This renders jump-bidding unprofitable because it ties the deviating player to
offering a higher-than-equilibrium share to the equilibrium player until agreement is reached.
(iii) The only way of using private information is to gradually release it by playing partially
revealing, type-dependent mixed actions until all information is transferred.
A.2.2 General p
In this subsection we present a fully worked example for the case of θ ∈ {0, 5}. In principle, our
problem is to find areas (ie. parameterised equilibria) in p1×p2 demarcated by our equilibrium
conditions (which are polynomial inequalities). These conditions are simply the preference of
the continuation payoff over the quitting payoff or vice versa and indifference between the
two for mixed actions. Imposing these conditions at each stage of the game gives a region
of the corresponding information requirements in p1 × p2. As θ¯ becomes large, however, these
conditions become numerous and of increasingly high order and hence solving for the resulting
systems of equilibrium conditions becomes difficult even for state of the art computer math
packages.12
Since we are looking for all full-dimension equilibria now,13 we have to consider both low-
and high-signal mixed actions the continuation probability of which we denote by α and α¯. To
12 The field concerned with the study of such problems in general is that of algebraic geometry. However, even
using specialised computer software developed for the study of algebraic geometry problems we were unable
to compute results for cases where θ¯ is significantly larger than in the present example. For a survey of the
methods and techniques involved see Baxter and Iserles (2003).
13 We call solutions ‘full-dimension’ equilibria if they have an interior in the map p1 × p2. The complementary
‘measure zero’ equilibria are knife-edge parameter cases which we disregard in the present analysis.
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denote strategy profiles we use matrices where, for instance(
1 1 1 m
1 m m 0
)
represents the profile
(
α¯11 = 1 α¯
2
2 = 1 α¯
3
1 = 1 α¯
4
2 ∈ (0, 1)
α11 = 1 α
2
2 =∈ (0, 1) α
3
1 =∈ (0, 1) α
4
2 = 0
)
.
The time-5 continuation probability α51 is zero for any p and any signal and is therefore omitted.
In accord with our model specification, the signal accuracy p = (p1, p2) specifies the probability
with which the received signal is correctly indicating the true value of the object. The possible
range for the publicly known (asymmetric) idiosyncratic signal precision pi is [
1/2, 1], i = {1, 2}
where pi =
1/2 means that Pi gets no additional information on top of her priors and pi = 1
means that her signal is fully revealing. Hence the case with incomplete information on one
side is described by p = (1, 0). Matrices such as the one above represent systems of polyno-
mial inequalities solved by a system of restrictions on the constants α and p. These results are
summarised in fig. 4. In the following we list the strategies for which solutions in p (ie. pa-
rameterised equilibrium candidates) can be found. We sort them according to the number of
pure low-type continuation actions the strategies contain. These parameterised solutions in-
volve recurring conditions f1(·)–f3(·) for mixed actions which are defined for convenience in
the legend of fig. 4.
The remarkable result is that there is a unique map of full-dimension parameterised equi-
libria which covers p1 × p2. Hence the essential uniqueness result of the analysis of the case
of incomplete information on one side is preserved in this particular example of incomplete
information on both sides for any parameter combination.
i) No pure low-type continuation
(
1 m 1 m
m 0 m 0
)
⇒ 4/5 ≤ p1 ≤ 1 ∧ 0 ≤ p2 ≤
3p1 − 4
p1 − 3
for (A.12)
α11 =
7−25p1+25p21
3−20p1+25p21
, α¯22 =
5p1−4
5p1−3
, α31 =
5p1−4
5α11p1−α
1
1
, and α¯42 =
5p1−2
5p1−1
.
(
1 m 1 m
m m m m
)
⇒ 4/5 ≤ p1 ≤ 1 ∧ p2 =
1/2 (A.13)
This is the essentially unique equilibrium of the case of incomplete information on one side. It
is not directly comparable to the other equilibria because of the implicit constraint that αt2 =
α¯t2 = α
t
2 for all t stemming from the fact that P1 has perfect information in that model. It is a
measure zero equilibrium with α11 =
7−25p1+25p21
3−20p1+25p21
, α22 =
5p1−4
5p1−3
, α31 =
5p1−4
5α11p1−α
1
1
, and α42 =
5p1−2
5p1−1
.
(
1 1 1 m
m m m 0
)
⇒

(i) 0.8453 ≤ p1 ≤ 0.9515 ∧
3p1−4
p1−3
≤ p2 ≤ f2(p1)
(ii) 0.9515 < p1 ≤ 1 ∧
3p1−4
p1−3
≤ p2 ≤ f1(p1)
for (A.14)
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α22 =
4−3p1−3p2+p1p2
3−3p1−3p2+p1p2
, α31 =
−3α11−p1+3α
1
1p1−p2+3α
1
1p2+2p1p2−α
1
1p1p2
−2α11+2α
1
1p1+2α
1
1p2+α
1
1p1p2
, and
α¯42 =
2α22−3p1−2α
2
2p1+2p2−2α
2
2p2+p1p2−α
2
2p1p2
−4p1+p2+3p1p2
.
(
1 1 1 1
m m 0 0
)
⇒

(i)
5/8 ≤ p1 ≤ .9078 ∧ f1(p1) ≤ p2 ≤ 1
(ii) 0.9078 < p1 < 1 ∧
p1
4−3p1
≤ p2 ≤ 1
for (A.15)
α22 =
4−3p1−3p2+p1p2
3−3p1−3p2+p1p2
and α11 =
−p1−p2+2p1p2
3−3p1−3p2+p1p2
.
(
1 1 1 1
m m m m
)
⇒ f1(p1) ≤ p2 ≤
p1
4− 3p1
∧ 0.9078 ≤ p1 ≤ 1 (A.16)
ii) One pure low-type continuation
(
1 1 m 0
1 m 0 0
)
⇒ 1/2 ≤ p1 ≤
3/5 ∧
3/5 ≤ p2 ≤
3− 2p1
2 + p1
for (A.17)
α22 =
3−3p1−3p2+p1p2
2p1−3p2+p1p2
and α¯31 =
3−5p2
2p1−3p2+p1p2
.
(
1 1 1 0
1 0 0 0
)
⇒

(i)
3/5 ≤ p1 ≤ 0.6202 ∧
3−2p1
2+p1
≤ p2 ≤
3p1
2+p1
(ii) 0.6202 < p1 ≤
4/5 ∧
3−2p1
2+p1
≤ p2 ≤
−4+4p1
−4+3p1
. (A.18)
(
1 1 1 0
1 m m 0
)
⇒

(i)
1/2 ≤ p1 ≤
3/5 ∧
3−2p1
2+p1
≤ p2 ≤ f2(p1)
(ii) 3/5 < p1 ≤
16/25 ∧
3p1
2+p1
≤ p2 ≤ f2(p1)
for (A.19)
α22 =
−3p1+2p2+p1p2
−2+2p1+2p2+p1p2
and α31 =
−3+2p1+2p2+p1p2
−2+2p1+2p2+p1p2
.
(
1 1 1 m
1 0 m 0
)
⇒


(i) 0.6202 ≤ p1 ≤ 0.64 ∧
4p1−4
3p1−4
≤ p2 ≤
3p1/2p1
(ii) 0.64 < p1 ≤
4/5 ∧
4p1−4
3p1−4
≤ p2 ≤ f2(p1)
(iii) 4/5 < p1 ≤ .8453 ∧ f3(p1) ≤ p2 ≤ f2(p1)
(iv) .8453 < p1 < 0.9756 ∧ f3(p1) ≤ p2 ≤
3p1−4
p1−3
for (A.20)
α42 =
−3p1+2p2+p1p2
4p1+2p2+3p1p2
and α31 =
4−4p1−4p2+3p1p2
−4p1+p2+3p1p2
.
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(
1 1 1 m
1 m m 0
)
⇒


(i) p1 =
1/2 ∧ p2 =
4/5 ∧ α¯
4
2, α
2
2, α
3
1
(ii) p1 = 0.55 ∧ p2 = 0.77 ∧ α¯
4
2, α
2
2, α
3
1
(iii) p1 = 0.60 ∧ p2 = 0.7444 ∧ α¯
4
2, α
2
2, α
3
1
(iv) p1 = 0.95 ∧ p2 = 0.6698 ∧ α¯
4
2, α
2
2, α
3
1
(v) p1 > 0.95⇒ ∅
. (A.21)
(
1 1 1 1
1 m m 0
)
⇒


(i) 1/2 ≤ p1 <=
5/8 ∧ f2(p1) ≤ p2 ≤ 1
(ii) 5/8 < p1 <
4/5 ∧ f2(p1) ≤ p2 ≤ f1(p1)
(iii) 5/8 < p1 ≤ 0.9515 ∧ f2(p1) ≤ p2 ≤ f1(p1)
for (A.22)
α22 =
p1+p2−2p1p2
−2+2p1+2p2+p1p2
and α31 =
−3+2p1+2p2+p1p2
−2+2p1+2p2+p1p2
.
This is the equilibrium β∗ discussed in the main text.
iii) Two pure low-type continuations
(
1 1 0 0
1 1 0 0
)
⇒ 1/2 ≤ p1 ≤
3/5 ∧
1/2 ≤ p2 ≤
3/5. (A.23)
(
1 1 1 0
1 1 0 0
)
⇒ 3/5 ≤ p1 ≤
4/5 ∧
1/2 ≤ p2 ≤
3− 2p1
2 + p1
. (A.24)
iv) Discussion
The map in fig. 4 has two striking features: (1) The strategy profiles (A.12)–(A.24) fully cover
our parameter space p1×p2. (2) There is an unique equilibrium for any p in full dimension.
14 The
equilibria are intuitively appealing. For instance in the lower-left-corner equilibrium region
(A.23), the players have very little information and cannot effectively discriminate between the
high and low signal states. Hence they bid up to the expectation of the object and quit as soon
as the required bid exceeds this expectation in a (near-)pooling strategy. As expected from
the analysis of the case of incomplete information on one side, (A.13), the essentially unique
equilibrium of that case can be retrieved in the more general setting of incomplete information
14 There are more parameterised equilibria of measure zero but we disregard them in the present discussion.
There are no other equilibria in full dimension p.
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Figure 4: The equilibrium map for θ ∈ {0, 5} in p1 × p2 signal accuracy space; the area β
∗ is circled.
on both sides. For α51 = 0, it occupies the line segment p1 ∈ [
4/5, 1] for p2 =
1/2. The equilibrium
β∗ discussed in the main section and in last subsection’s example for p = (.8, .75) is confirmed
by (A.19). The map shows both equilibria in fully revealing (separating) and non-revealing
strategies: In (A.18), for instance, P2 reveals her type at t=2 by quitting. Our general analysis
shows that β∗ cannot vanish as the object’s high value is increased.
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